Indonesia is undergoing transition and soon, a new president will be inaugurated. 
Introduction
During the third presidential debate on 22 June 2014, presidential candidate Joko Widodo, or commonly recognized as ‚Jokowi‛, promoted the idea of Indonesia being a ‚maritime axis‛ in Southeast Asia. Being a ‚maritime axis‛, based on Joko Widodo's policy platform on defence and foreign policy submitted to the General Elections Commission (KPU), would secure Indonesia's economic and security interests in the maritime sector while also boosting Indonesia's identity as a maritime power and archipelagic nation. Following his inauguration in October 2014, Jokowi now has the opportunity to fulfil his ambitions of Indonesia being a global maritime axis.
Changes to Indonesia's foreign and defence policy to achieve Jokowi's ambitious ‚maritime axis‛ are inevitable. Thus, this article aims to examine the possible changes and continuities to Indonesian foreign and defence policy in relation to the addition of the ‚maritime axis‛. These include a change in multilateral engagement through the addition of the Indian Ocean Rim as a location of interest and in Indonesia's defence outlook. However, while changes will be present, the sacrosanct principles of Indonesia's ‚free and active‛ foreign policy will remain the same.
This article first provides a review on the strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific. It notes the changing strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific, with the involvement of great powers and the emergence of the Indian Ocean as a new geopolitical interest. Then, we examine the ‚maritime axis‛ doctrine and the changes that it would bring to Indonesia's foreign and defence policy.
The Changing Regional Strategic Environment of the Indo-Pacific
The strategic environment of the IndoPacific is steadily becoming unpredictable. In the Pacific, Gindarsah (2014) notes that major powers in the region will prefer strategic competition over cooperation. China's military growth, combined with its increased assertiveness and economic power, is steadily becoming a power that should be treated with caution. In the South China Sea, the PLA Navy has made their advance into contested waters near Malaysia and the Philippines. 1 On the other hand, the U.S. is increasing their presence in the region through their 'Asia Pivot', or rebalance strategy, which aims to maintain the U.S' strategic and economic commitments. 2 Mahadevan (2013) notes that once the 'pivot' has been fully completed, it is expected that almost 60 percent of the U.S. Navy will be stationed in the Pacific.
On a regional level, ASEAN has been an important cornerstone for Indonesian foreign policy and ultimately, the advancement of Indonesian national interest. However, ASEAN remains incapable of resolving ongoing security conflicts amongst and within its members and other great powers in the region. The South China Sea dispute continues to be a potentially disruptive issue within ASEAN. With four ASEAN members as claimants in the dispute and the presence of two major powers in the region, ASEAN cohesion is being tested. The Philippines' relations with China remains tense and as a result, the Philippines have turned to the U.S. and Japan for support. The probability of a terrorist threat in Southeast Asia. 9 To address these security issues in Southeast Asia and to further facilitate regional integration in the face of regional uncertainties, ASEAN is to launch the ASEAN Political-Security Community in 2015. However, whether ASEAN could successfully achieve the APSC is still debatable. Solidum (2003) argues that ASEAN's institutions and existing platforms, such as the ASEAN Way, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and the ASEAN Regional Forum, have provided a way for ASEAN to engage in Track Two diplomacy and maintain security in the region. Acharya (2001) praises ASEAN for being a nascent security community despite the many challenges that it faces, while Khoo (2004) argues that ASEAN's negative norms hinder the formation of a full-fledged security community. According to Solidum (2003) , security in Southeast Asia was a result of ‚ASEAN values of peace, economic, social, and cultural development, cooperation, political stability, and regional stability and progress‛. On the other hand, Jones and Smith (2001) argue that ASEAN is ‚neither a security nor an economic community, either in being or in prospect.‛ Jones and Smith emphasize on the shallow substance of the organization, criticizing the organization for producing a ‚rhetorical and institutional shell‛.
One interesting point of Jokowi's foreign policy platform is the inclusion of the Indian Ocean as an area of Indonesian foreign policy interest. Despite being in close proximity with the Indian Ocean, it has remained out of the Indonesian foreign policy lenses for some time. Being out of the spotlight for the majority of the 20 th century, 9 Chanda, Nayan. 12 March 2014. Rohingyas vs. Buddhists? Huffington Post. Accessed on 15 September 2014 from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nayanchanda/rohingyas-vs-buddhists_b_4950999.html the region, known as the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR), has lately become an ‚area of crucial geostrategic importance‛ and is also described as ‚…politically troubled and potentially combustible‛ (Michel and Sticklor, 2012) . The Indian Ocean has become the world's most important energy thoroughfare, fashionably described by Kaplan (2009) as an ‚economic jugular‛, with 36 per cent of Middle Eastern oil passing through the Indian Ocean. Developed countries, such as Japan, China and the U.S., rely heavily on Middle Eastern oil imports. Furthermore, the littoral states around the Indian Ocean also boasts abundant economic resources, such as gold, diamonds, oil and gas reserves. Two-thirds of the world's oil reserves and one-third of global gas reserves are located in littoral states of the Indian Ocean. The emergence of China and India further boost the importance of the region as they show interest in the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) and the overall stability of the states near the Ocean. 10 Both traditional and non-traditional maritime issues riddle the Indian Ocean region. In a traditional sense, the Indian Ocean is home to some of the world's largest military spenders. With the increased attention from major powers, the region is prone to traditional security threats such as a potential security dilemma fuelled by suspicions between the U.S., China, and India. The three powers are the top five world military powers 11 and all have interests in the region. The U.S. maintains strategic interests in the Indian Ocean as it is vital for the execution of U.S. foreign policy, which involves mobilization of troops for NATO campaigns in the Middle East. China is also seeking to increase its influence in the Indian Ocean in an attempt to balance the U.S. by 10 Rumley, 2013, pp. 62-63 adopts an ‚open regionalism‛ approach, similar to APEC, which is centred on nonbinding commitments on a voluntary basis and agreement by consensus (Kelegama, 2002 countries for any meaningful integration to take place.‛ Based on Kelegama's observations, the IORA has yet to become an effective regional architecture for maritime security. The absence of a shared interest inhibits the development of definite cooperation among IORA members. Though there have been initiatives, such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and limited joint naval exercises, security cooperation among members are more operational-based and less policy-based (Santikajaya, 2014).
On a domestic level, Indonesia has long retained its inward-looking posture. The Armed Forces (TNI) is more geared towards internal threats, such as separatism and domestic violence, and maintaining national stability. 17 Power projection across the seas has been the least of Indonesia's priorities for the last decade. As of such, the Armed Forces emphasize more on land forces rather than maritime forces. According to the IISS (2014), in 2014, the Indonesian Navy only has 65 000 personnel amongst the total of 300 400 personnel. This condition is understandable, as Indonesia wishes to maintain a peaceful profile rather than an assertive profile. However, considering the size of the Indonesia's territory, the size of Indonesia's military is not enough to meet the Minimum Essential Force (MEF), especially in maritime security. Additionally, Indonesia's indigenous strategic industries, especially the shipbuilding industry represented by PT PAL, have been slow to develop due to high production costs from taxes and insufficient facilities and equipment. 
Jokowi's Maritime Axis: What it Means for Foreign Policy and Defence
Jokowi's ‚maritime axis‛ recognizes Indonesia's geopolitical position as an archipelagic state and puts emphasis on the maritime domain as a medium for Indonesia's foreign and defence policy. Jokowi's foreign policy outlook emphasizes on Indonesia becoming a strong regional maritime power not only in strength but also in diplomacy. Jokowi's platform acknowledges the importance of maritime diplomacy in resolving territorial maritime disputes with neighbours, the need to safeguard Indonesia's maritime domain, and alleviating maritime tensions between great powers in the region. It also emphasizes the importance of the IndoPacific region for the implementation of Indonesian foreign policy. Jokowi puts forward five points for Indonesia's regional policy i.e. (1) consolidation of Indonesian leadership in ASEAN, (2) strengthening regional architecture to prevent great power hegemony, (3) development of strategic bilateral ties, (4) managing the impacts of regional economic integration and free trade on domestic economy, and (5) ‚comprehensive maritime cooperation‛ through the IORA. 19 Furthermore, in his speech at the East Asia Summit in November 2014, Jokowi further elaborated on his ‚maritime axis‛ doctrine by listing the five pillars of the maritime axis, namely (1) revival of Indonesian maritime culture and ultimately, archipelagic identity; (2) development of oceans and fisheries; (3) improving maritime economy; (4) maritime diplomacy to address illegal fishing and other security threats; and (5) boosting Indonesia's maritime defences (Neary, 2014) . ASEAN has always been the cornerstone of Indonesia's foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific and it will likely remain as such. From its foundation, Indonesia has been active in ASEAN to pursue its regional interests. However, with Jokowi's emerging ‚maritime axis‛ and subsequent policies, there are indications that ASEAN might be losing its centrality as Indonesia's main multilateral platform. As observed by Syailendra (2015) , Indonesia's ‚high profile‛ foreign policy approach shows signs of declining engagement in ASEAN in favour of a more nationalistic approach. Recent events, such as the sinking of illegal fishing ships and reluctance to participate in the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), can be interpreted as signs of Indonesia's moving away from its ASEAN centrality. However, developing a more nationalistic approach towards ASEAN does not necessarily mean that Indonesia will strike ASEAN off its multilateral institutions list. ASEAN has provided Indonesia with a platform for settling disputes with major powers and connect existing regional organizations within the Asia-Pacific region. Through ASEAN, Indonesia has managed to connect Southeast Asia with some of the larger players in the Asia-Pacific. For example, the ASEAN Regional Forum has provided a means for discussion and cooperation on Asia-Pacific security issues between the U.S., China, and Japan. Jokowi's approach to foreign policy can be considered as pragmatic rather than nationalistic. He aims to show that Indonesia is willing to cooperate with other countries, but not to the extent of comprising national interest. This approach corresponds nicely with Jokowi's vision of consolidating Indonesian leadership in ASEAN. It implies Indonesia's intent on playing a bigger role in ASEAN to further Indonesian national interest through ASEAN as an important foothold in establishing the ‚maritime axis‛.
Indonesian interest in the Indian
Ocean is a new addition to Indonesia's foreign policy following Jokowi's ‚maritime axis‛. In particular, in October 2015, Indonesia will chair the IORA for two years, succeeding Australia as the former chair. It is likely that Jokowi's ‚maritime axis‛ takes into account Indonesia's position in IORA. Since the addition of six priorities in 2011, IORA's agenda has a lot in common with Indonesia's interests in the Indian Ocean, particularly maritime security and economic interests according to Jokowi's pillars of the ‚maritime axis‛. For example, IORA's agenda on maritime safety and security coincides with Jokowi's interest of developing the Indonesian Navy to better provide regional security against illegal fishing and piracy. serious change in Indonesia's previously-held threat perceptions, which were mostly focused on a continental defence outlook. The previous Defence White Paper, published in 2008, puts much emphasis on internal security concerns, such as separatism and internal violence related to ethnicity, religion, race, and communities, and maintaining continental defence, while putting little regard for the numerous naval chokepoints, EEZs, and outer islands in Indonesia. Furthermore, the lack of Indonesian presence in its territorial waters has caused Indonesia to suffer from a lack of deterrence, especially against illegal traders using Indonesia's waterways and island claims by neighbours. 22 To that end, Jokowi plans to gradually increase the defence budget by 1.5 percent over five years, which is to be channelled into defence equipment procurement, rejuvenating the Indonesian strategic industry and developing maritime infrastructure. The increased defence budget is also expected to fund defensive measures in Indonesian waters, such as a military base equipped with combat aircraft in Natuna to protect the island against a potential flashpoint in the South China Sea. 23 But most importantly, the defence budget will be channelled to bolster Indonesia's naval capacity to reach the MEF required to safeguard Indonesian waters.
There is a possibility of Indonesia securing its relationship with India as a strategic partner to carry out the ‚maritime axis‛, as both countries share similar interests. The two countries have a long history of bilateral and multilateral ties, especially in the realm of security and economy. Since the 1990s, India has been expanding its ‚sphere of influence‛ in the Indian Ocean and to a larger extent, Southeast Asia, by promoting itself as ‚benign provider of maritime security‛ (Brewster, 2011) . In 2001, both countries signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement and since then, have conducted numerous defence exchanges. Under the Defence Cooperation Agreement, Indonesia-India security ties also expanded to defence industry cooperation; however, progress in the area seems to be slow. Indonesia has yet to acquire India's Brahmos cruise missile technology. According to Brewster (2011, p. 233 ), Indonesia's limited defence budget and India's limitations are the key factors hindering further security relations. Aside from defence industry cooperation, India and Indonesia have also been active in maritime security in the Andaman Sea. Since the 1990s, India and Indonesia have conducted joint naval exercises and naval visits to bases in Andaman and Nicobar (Brewster, 2011) . In trade, bilateral trade between the two countries reached US$ 20.1 billion in 2012-2013 and Indonesia has become India's second-largest trading partner in ASEAN (Ministry of External Affairs, 2014). Importexport from the two countries ranges from palm oil to pharmaceuticals. These existing bilateral relations, added with shared interests in the Indo-Pacific and membership in IORA, could become the basis of a fruitful relationship in the future.
Conclusion
President Joko Widodo's ambitions of a ‚pan-Indo-Pacific‛ Indonesia is represented in his maritime axis doctrine of foreign and defence policy. The ‚maritime axis‛ doctrine shows a significant expansion in Indonesia's foreign policy and defence ambitions. Not only will Indonesia strive to maintain its ASEAN centrality, it also seeks to expand the Indonesian sphere of influence by ‚looking west‛ towards the Indian Ocean. To achieve those ends, Jokowi has decided upon a number of measures, such as reforming the nation's defence outlook to accommodate a more outward-looking and maritime posture, increasing the defence budget to procure defence equipment, using multilateral platforms to engage with great powers in the region, and actively contribute towards institution-building in the Indo-Pacific. These measures will likely be the highlights of the Jokowi administration throughout his term. Despite these changes, Indonesia's foreign policy principles of ‚free and active‛ will continue to be the foundation of future policies. Jokowi's maritime axis will see to an Indonesia that plays a larger role in building the Indo-Pacific region.
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